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The subject matter of economic development and political development
intersect over a broad front.  Economic policy is made by incumbent
politicians in the context  of political institutions.  The analysis of  the
economic impact of alternative policies  is  the stock in trade of the
economist.  The choice  of the alternative policies  that are subjected to
economic analysis  is  influenced by the agendas of political parties and
interests.  The subject matter of political science includes  the political
decision process by which policies are adopted and implemented.  It also
includes  the social consequences and the public response to  policy.
There  is a deep  fault line  that divides  scholarship in the  two  fields.
Each field tends to treat the knowledge  it draws  on from the other as  implicit
rather than explicit.  It seems apparent that the implicit theorizing by
economists about political development and of political  scientists about
economic development should be replaced by more explicit attempts to  develop
an integrated theory of political and economic development.  Political
scientists and economists  loosely grouped within the collective choice  school
of political economy have advanced our understanding of the processes by which
economic resources  are translated into political resources and political
resources are  translated into economic resources.1  But a similar convergence
of theory and analysis has not yet been achieved among students of political
and economic development.This paper represents an attempt  to assess what development economists
should learn from theory and research in the field of political development to
advance knowledge and policy  in the field of economic development.  I proceed
by first reviewing the contributions of several development economists who
have attempted to  give explicit attention to  the political preconditions  or
conditions  for economic development.  I then review the evolution of thought
in the field of political development.  This leads me to a discussion of the
central problem of the growth of political power and its relationship to
economic growth.
Political Development in Development Economics
Economic development theory and analysis has concerned itself primarily
with the surface patterns  and proximate sources of economic growth.  Patterns
have been described in terms of the transformation of structure 2  and the
succession of stages 3 . Sources of growth have been analyzed in terms of the
response to  investment in physical and human capital.
Relatively little attention has been given by economists to  the
political  "preconditions" or "conditions" for economic growth.  When
development economics emerged as a subdiscipline in the 1940s and early 1950s
there was a pervasive view among economists  that the late industrializing
countries  required strong authoritarian state institutions in order to
mobilize the resources required for growth.  Democracy was a "luxury" that
could not be afforded by poor states.  This view drew on and was reinforced by
the apparent success of centralized planning in Stalin's Russia.  By the early
1970s there was increasing skepticism among development economists about the
merits of forced draft mobilization and the efficacy of central planning.  A
view emerged that success in economic development could be more readilyachieved, or at least sustained, in an environment characterized by a liberal
economic  and political order.
In general, these views  emerged more out of experience and casual
observation rather than serious scholarship.  A few economic historians and
development economists did, however, attempt to  explain the relationship
between political and economic development in somewhat greater depth.  In
this section I refer to  the work of Alexander Gerschenkron, Karl de
Schweinitz, Jagdish Bhagwati, Walt W. Rostow, and Irma Adelman and Cynthia
Taft Morris.
Gerschenkron
The theme  that late-industrializing countries benefit from the evolution
of strong state  institutions with the capacity  to directly intervene and
participate  in economic activities  is a pervasive theme  in Alexander
Gerschenkron's studies of European economic history.5  A major organizing
principle in Gerschenkron's work  is  the continuing tension between change and
continuity in history.  Industrialization occurs  in rapid "spurts"  along the
lines suggested in the  "take-off" or  "big-push" views of economic  development.
The more backward the economy the more likely that industrialization would
occur  "discontinuously as a sudden great spurt."
In the case  of the  early industrializing countries it was sufficient for
the state to pursue policies  aimed at creating a suitable environment,
through an appropriate legal framework and the supplying of physical
infrastructure, for the growth of industrial  enterprise.  But in the more
backward economies of Russia and of eastern and southern Europe "successful
industrialization requires more than simply introducing the institutional
framework that  suffices for the purposes of industrialization in an advanced4
country."  The  state must have the power  to pursue "forced draft"
industrialization--to extract surpluses from a reluctant peasantry and to
direct capital into industrial development.
Gerschenkron displayed considerable caution in drawing the implications
of his analysis  for development policy.  Other scholars who share
Gerschenkron's historical perspective have been less reticent.  In
Industrialization and Democracy Karl de Schweinitz argued that while economic
growth and democracy are complementary in the advanced western economies,  this
relationship is reversed during the early stages of modern economic
development. 6  The Euro-American route to  democracy is  closed to  the presently
less-developed countries.  The  impulse for industrialization must come  from
the center of political power and spread outward into society rather than, as
was  the case  in the West during the nineteenth century, coming from society
itself.  If the underdeveloped countries are to grow economically they must
limit democratic participation in political affairs--"Justice must take a back
seat  to  growth  objectives." 7
Jagdish Bhagwati was even more explicit.  In his  introductory text, The
Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, Bhagwati insisted that "socialist
countries, such as  the Soviet Union and mainland China, have an immense
advantage:  their totalitarian structure shields the government from the  . . .
reactionary judgments of the electorate.  The Soviet government's firm control
on expansion in consumption over the last few decades could hardly ever be
attempted by a democratic government.  Another advantage of the socialist
countries is their passionate conviction and dedication to  the objective of
economic growth--which contrasts visibly with the halting and hesitant beliefs
and actions of most democracies. "85
I cite de Schweinitz and Bhagwati here, not to  criticize their work from
the vantage of the  late 20th Century, but to  emphasize the pervasiveness of
the view that authoritarian regimes, whether capitalist or socialist, were
more effective at mobilizing resources for development than democracies.  The
belief that authoritarian regimes are conducive to economic growth was
pervasive, not only among students  of economic and political development, but
among the political elites and enterprise managers in developing countries and
also among the officers and technocrats  in the international  financial
institutions and assistance agencies. 9
Rostow
During the  1950s, Walt W. Rostow elaborated and popularized a theory of
stages of economic  growth.1 0  The stages were denominated (a) traditional
society,  (b)  preconditions for growth, (c) take-off into sustained growth,
(d) drive  to maturity and (e)  high mass consumption.  The  stage
characterization drew primarily on the history of western economies  for their
empirical  support.  Rostow extended the  implications  of the stage perspective
for development policy in contemporary developing countries.  This was
followed, in the early 1970s, by an effort to relate his stage perspective to
the process of political development.11  In this effort Rostow drew on the
experience of a broad range of developed and advanced developing countries
(England, United States, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and
Mexico).  Rostow's approach was to explore  the tension between traditional
political culture and the new problems or  tasks  that the process  of economic
growth imposes on the polity as  a  society moves successively through the
development stages.Cycles in economic and political development emerge as the
characteristic pattern in the traditional society.  Custom and the  elders
rule in the clan and tribal societies--"but conflict and conquest lead to
kingdoms and empires."  The expansion of resources during the upswing leads to
improvement in administration and security.  But the growth of bureaucracy and
the resources required to maintain security lead to  the erosion of political
freedom and imposes economic burdens on the peasantry that can not be
maintained in the presence of  static agricultural technology.  During the
period when societies are establishing the preconditions for growth the most
dominant characteristic is  political and economic  insecurity.  There is
unstable competition among the aristocracy, the new entrepreneurs,  the
bureaucracy and the military--with the military often emerging in leadership
roles because of their mastery of technology and organization.
During the take-off stage growth of agricultural and industrial
production begins to generate new income  streams.  Competition between
classes  (labor and capital),  and estates  (military and civil bureaucracies)
over control over the new income streams becomes a source of political stress
and crisis.  But, Rostow argues, by the  time that the drive to maturity is
well underway constitutional issues of justice and equity and economic
policies toward growth and welfare become easier to manage and a liberal
democratic order emerges as  the most effective political system to sustain
take-off.
The age of high mass consumption places new stress  on political
institutions.  The demand for  improvements in the quality of life replaces
the older demand for commodities.  This extends  to the public sector where
demand for the quality of public services confronts  the use of publicresources to  pursue security or other  international political objectives.
Experience with this  stage  is  so limited,  in Rostow's view, that it  is
difficult to  adequately foresee either  its political or economic
implications.
Adelman and Morris
During the 1970s and 1980s  Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris have
pursued an exceedingly ambitious research agenda designed to  explore the role
of  "initial  institutions" on the pace and structure of economic
development.12  Their methodology is empirical rather  than theoretical.  A
variety of statistical methods were employed to  identify "salient
configurations of economic and political change" and "for grouping closely
related variables  for different country types and groups."  An attempt is
made to  capture the role of political institutions by variables measuring the
(a) domestic economic role of government,  (b) socioeconomic character of
political leadership,  (c)  strength of national representative institutions,
(d)  political stability,  (e) foreign economic dependence and colonial status.
The Adelman-Morris results  for the 1850-1914 period are  consistent with
the  perspective of the "modernization" school  in sociology and political
science.
"At critical junctions  . . . political  institutions mattered
greatly.  With rare exceptions, economic growth and its benefits did
not diffuse far where domestic  landed elites aligning with foreign
export interest dominated the political process.  In all  countries
undergoing substantial  industrialization, domestic commercial and
industrial classes had or gained significant power in national
leadership.  In more politically diverse country groups--for
example, land-abundant dependent countries--economic  growth spread
far only when landed elites no  longer dominated domestic  economic
policies."138
The emergence of a legal system that strengthened property and market
institutions was important for market expansion, industrial development and
agricultural development.  In their earlier book, which focuses on more
recent economic history, Adelman and Morris were not able  to discover  the
close association between political and economic development that was
revealed in their analysis of the 1850-1914 period.  There was no systematic
association between the form of the political system and the performance of
the economic  system.  Indeed, the most striking pattern that emerges  from
their empirical analysis is  the progressive differentiation and separation of
the social, economic, and political spheres from each other.  Furthermore,
this differentiation begins to  emerge relatively early in the development
process.
It has been difficult to  discover broad agreement among economic
historians and development economists who have given explicit attention to
political development.  It does appear, however, that there would be fairly
broad assent to the proposition that authoritarian regimes in which command
over economic and political resources was relatively undifferentiated
characterized the societies  from which the presently developed market
economies emerged.  Furthermore, in these societies  the emergence of
capitalism preceded the emergence of democracy.  Substantial disagreement
remains, however, about whether sufficient concentration of political
resources "to avoid the opposition of any sectional  interest"  is  essential
for economic development in todays poor countries.
Political Science and Political Development
The 1960s was a period of intense intellectual ferment  in the field of
political science.  Insights based on advances in the understanding ofindividual and group behavior, drawing on psychology, sociology, and economics
were incorporated into the theoretical domain of politics.  The concept of
political system was elaborated and distinguished from the changes  in the
environment in which political activity takes place.  New quantitative methods
from statistics and economics were adopted to  explore the relationships
between the political system and its  environment.  The emergence of new states
turned the attentions of political scientists  to  apply these advances  in
theory and methods to  the problem of mobilizing and allocating political
resources.14
One indication of the interest and ambitions of political scientists  in
political development was  the major research effort organized by the  Social
Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics  (SSRC/CCP) to
"generate a doctrine of political  development that would prove as  powerful an
analytical  tool  as economic theory had provided in its  assault on problems of
national poverty."15  Interest in political  development was given further
impetus  in Title  IX of the  Foreign Assistance Act of 1966.  The U.S. Agency
for International Development (US/AID)  was instructed:  "In carrying out
programs  authorized in this chapter emphasis shall be placed on assuring
maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of
people  in developing countries through the encouragement of democratic,
private and local government institutions.1 6
By the mid-1970s, however, interest in issues  of political development
by political scientists was rapidly eroding.  Scholarship in the  field of
political development found itself facing a series of methodological,
empirical,  and ideological challenges.10
A review by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner vigorously challenged the
methodological foundations of the research carried out under  the auspices of
the SSRC/CCP.  They characterized the methodology employed in the research
carried out under the auspices of  the Committee as  "persuasive discourse".
The process by which the authors move "from the raw material to  the theory is
never made explicit.  Rules of inference are not spelled out.  Intuitive
processes are apparently considered to be more important" 17
Holt and Turner insisted that progress  toward the objectives  that the
Committee set for itself, a collective effort  to construct a theory of
political development, could only be advanced by use of an analytic-deductive
approach to  theory construction and empirical analysis.  While these
criticisms were never explicitly acknowledged, it is  clear that by the  early
1980s there was increasing skepticism within political science about the
usefulness of the concept of political development as  the focus for a research
agenda.18
The empirical  challenge centered around the continued relevance of the
Anglo-American linear model of political development.  Prior to the mid-1950s,
the literature was dominated by what Robert A. Packenham has termed the
"legal-formal approach."  Political development was  identified with the
attributes of English and American liberal constitutional democracy.  The
level of political development of a country could be measured by its  linear
distance  from the Anglo-American model.19  Dissatisfaction with the Anglo-
American model was stated as a challenge by Gabriel A. Almond in his  1966
presidential address  to the American Political Science Association.
"Enlightenment theory began with the leviathan state and postulated
as the legitimate problem of political theory that of bringing the
leviathan under control through institutional and legal checks  and
balances, and through popular processes.  Modern political theory11
has  to ask how the leviathan itself comes into  existence, in order
to cope with the intellectual problems  of understandin  Othe
political prospects  and processes of the new nations."
A second generation of scholars  attempted to move away from what was
regarded as  the excessive parochialism of the linear model.  Political
development was defined in terms of multidimensional  categories and analyzed
as a dependent variable--a response to changes in economic, sociological and
psychological variables. 21  Political scientists working within the framework
of  the modernization paradigm, adapted from sociology, viewed the emergence  of
market exchange  and economic development as  an important requisite  to
political democracy.  Changes in social structure and the erosion of
traditional social institutions were emphasized.  Changes in the political
culture,  at both the level of beliefs  and attitudes and the level of
personality, were held to  play independent roles in the process  of political
development still largely associated with the transition to  democracy.22
These views were, in turn, criticized by a third generation of scholars
who took their clue from the seminal article by Samuel P. Huntington on
"Political Development and Political Decay."23  Huntington defined "political
development" as  the institutionalization of political organizations and
procedures.  Furthermore, he identified political development with the
strength or capacity of government institutions--"whatever strengthens
governmental institutions." 24  The level of institutionalization was measured
by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of government
institutions.  He went on to  argue that if these criteria can be identified
and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their
institutionalization.2 512
Eckstein has suggested an even more ambitious agenda.  He assigns to
political development, as  subfield of development theory, the task of
"developing a theory of political stages  . . . one  that identifies distinct
stages which link primal to modern society."26  The political domain must be
distinguished from other dimensions of modernization--"What grows in
political development is  politics--the political domain of society"2 7--the
domain that includes legitimate power, conflict management, and the
regulation of social conduct.
Eckstein returns to  the history of English polity to sketch out a
prototype set of stages.  These include:  (a) primal polity--characterized by
symbolic leadership;  (b) substantive primacy--involving legal and extractive
power;  (c) "prophylactic" policy--including maintenance of order and
management of dissent;  (d) the polity of interests--involving the pursuit and
granting of privilege;  (e) the politics of incorporation--the virtual  total
politicization of social life;  and (f) political society--in which the realm
of privacy is minimized and political density is maximized--the role of power
is pervasive.
Modern democracies, in the historical perspective of the Eckstein
stages, "simply are the gentler  twins of totalitarian rule, mitigated by open
competition, free communications, and a sense of rights and liberties--which
compared to earlier times,  no longer really divides  the public from the
private, but is  a sense of political decency"28--in Huntington's terminology--
a softer form of institutionalization.
The ideological challenge grew out of the profound disillusionment on the
part of many younger social scientists with the impact of western cultural,
economic, political, and military penetration into non-western societies.  It13
was reinforced by the political fallout resulting from intellectual commitment
of a number of leading scholars in the field of political development to
influence the direction of political development in countries  such as Vietnam,
Chile, Brazil, Egypt, and others.  The consequences of U.S. interventions  in
Vietnam contributed to  the discrediting of both the subdiscipline and of the
scholars who had contributed to  the development of the field.2 9
The intellectual climate created by these experiences contributed to  the
rapid diffusion of what came to be known as  "dependency" or  "underdevelopment"
or "world systems"  theory as  an alternative to  the modernization paradigm as  a
lens through which to  interpret political, social, and economic  change in
Third World countries.  The dependency perspective initially drew on the work
of the Latin American structuralist school of economists for  its  empirical
support.  It turned  to neo-Marxian theories  of imperialism, particularly to
the work of Paul Baran for  its theoretical foundations.  But  it was the
colorful rhetoric employed by Andre Gunder Frank in his attacks on the
modernization school that was most  influential in diffusing the
underdevelopment perspective among a new generation of students  of comparative
politics. 30
The central theme  in Frank's polemic was that world capitalism, and
particularly trade between the countries of the center and the periphery,
rather than being an "engine of growth,"  was responsible for  "underdeveloping"
the Third World.  The same historical processes responsible  for the
development and expansion of capitalism at the center was responsible  for
underdevelopment--and for political and economic dependency--in the periphery.
By the mid-1980s commitment to  the dependency perspective was  rapidly
eroding--particularly in its  centers of origin in Latin America.  This was  in14
part due to the criticism of  scholars committed to classical Marxism.  More
important, however, was  the widening discrepancy between some of the more
extravagant implications of the theory and the record of economic and
political development in the 1970s and 1980s.  The assertion that external
economic linkages resulted in economic and political regression in the
periphery was not sustained by the historical record.31
I find myself dissatisfied with both the modernization and dependency
reformulations.  Huntington's identification of political development with the
strengthening of governmental institutions  is unduly restrictive.  His
emphasis on institutionalization focuses on process rather than outcome.  And
while Eckstein emphasizes  the final outcome of political development his
linear sequence of stages hardly pass  the test that he imposes on earlier
theories of political development.  "What is absent  . . .is  a theory of the
fundamental forces  . . .that  brought us  to our political condition and
continues to push us  through political turns."32  He is not able  to  escape the
criticism that has been made of economic  staging--a convenient rather than an
analytical way of slicing historical time.  Dependency theory had painted
itself into a cul de sac  from which it  is attempting to  escape by jettisoning
much of the baggage  it acquired during the  1970s.  It had, however, diverted a
generation of younger political scientists  from the more rigorous  theory
construction and testing  that Holt and Turner had called for in the mid-
1970s.33
The Political Basis of Economic Development
To what extent  is economic development conditioned by or even dependent
on political development?  Must political and economic development processes
be highly articulated?  There is a  strong theme in political development15
literature to  the effect that the  "overall level of political
institutionalization and the degree to which those institutions are
democratic or undemocratic affect the rate and character of economic  growth
and the distribution of wealth and income."34  Political theorists working in
the Marxian tradition have viewed political  development primarily in terms of
its  impact on economic organization and development.35  Kwame Nkrumah put the
same point more dramatically:  "Seek ye  first the political kingdom and all
things will be added unto  it." 36
In the following subsections  I attempt to  assess, drawing on the
political development literature, what political scientists have been able  to
infer about the implications of political development for economic
development.  I focus on three bodies of literature:  (a) quantitative
studies;  (b)  historical  studies;  and  (c) studies of political culture.
Quantitative Studies
During the 1950s  and 1960s, a large number of efforts, using cross
country statistical analysis,  to  test assumptions about  the impact of
political institutions on economic growth were made by political scientists.
Three major generalizations emerge from this body of research. 37
1.  Low income  countries characterized by low levels of
political  institutionalization--newly independent,  low
institutional density, political instability and
violence--were characterized by low rates of total and per
capita economic growth.
2.  Low income countries with authoritarian political systems
experienced more rapid rates of economic growth than countries
characterized by more democratic political systems.  The
generalization appeared to hold both for authoritarian regimes
of the left and the right.
3.  At higher levels of per capita income,  (roughly to  $250  in 1960
or  $750  in 1985  dollars),  the positive relationship between16
authoritarian political organization and the rate  of economic
growth tended to  disappear.
Most of the earlier'studies summarized by Huntington and Dominiques
involved little more than attempts to  establish statistical association
between indicators of political and economic development.  More recent
studies have attempted to  estimate more complex causal models that specify
the mechanisms by which different types of political regimes influence (or
are  influenced by) economic development.  One early example was an attempt by
Robert M. Marsh to  test the  "authoritarian model" of the relationship between
political and economic  development using data for 1955-1970.38  He interprets
his analysis  as providing "some support" for the authoritarian model--
"Political competition/democracy does have a significant effect on later rates
of economic development;  its  influence is  to retard the development rate
rather than to facilitate it."3 9  One has the  impression, reading the Marsh
paper, that he is somewhat reluctant to  accept the results of his  own
statistical results.  He emphasizes that his static model provides less
support  for the authoritarian model than the tests of his dynamic model.
However, in a  more recent quantitative study Abbas Pourgerami finds a
recursive relationship between democracy and development--a growing market
oriented economy has a  positive impact on the strengthening of democratic
institutions and democracy, in turn, has a  positive impact on economic
growth.40  A number of countries which appeared in the 1960s  to be
characterized both by relatively stable authoritarian regimes now appear to
be characterized by cycles  of both (a)  political stability and instability,
and (b)  rapid and slow economic  growth.  In authoritarian regimes  of both the
right and the left,  the successful transition to more open political systems
characterized by multiple centers of power has been exceedingly difficult.17
Autonomous centers of power, in either the public or the private sector  are
viewed as  potential threats  to political  regimes that are attempting to
husband the limited political resources available  to  them at the center.4 1
It is difficult to be certain, from this distance, whether the results
of the empirical  studies were a source of the shift in interest among
political scientists in the  late 1950s and 1960s  toward problems  of political
order and stability or whether the studies were, themselves, a reflection of
the shift.  Nevertheless, they tended to be quite  consistent with  the
conclusions reached by the economists who addressed the same issue during that
period.  Perhaps  the strongest inference that should be drawn from the
quantitative studies  is  that a poor country  that fails  to establish a
reasonable degree of political stability imposes a severe burden on the  forces
conducive  to economic growth.
Historical Studies
One of the more ambitious attempts to  explore the political basis for
economic development was made in the mid-1960s by Robert T. Holt and John E.
Turner.  In their book, The Political Bases of Economic Development, 42  they
accepted the Rostow stage model of economic development as a working
hypothesis and attempted to  examine the political developments  in the
"preconditions" stage that proceeds the  "take-off" stage.  According to Holt
and Turner:
"In order to manipulate in a desired manner the variables  that
concern us, we have concentrated attention upon France, 1600-1789;
China, 1644-1911;  Japan 1603-1868;  and England, 1558-1780.  Shortly
after the  final dates listed, Japan and England entered upon a
period of rapid industrialization, whereas  France and China lagged
behind in varying degrees.  If there are significant political
requirements for economic growth, and if there was no obvious
technological factors at work we should expect to  find certain18
political similarities between France and China, on the  one hand,
that distinguish them from Japan and England on the other."4 3
It is  difficult to capture the richness of the Holt-Turner analysis.
Yet a major conclusion that emerges from their work is that the premature
aggregation or concentration of political resources  represents a constraint on
economic development.  The governments of France and China were much more
active in infrastructure development than in Japan and England.  They had
greater fiscal capacity, provided a more secure legal framework for economic
activity, and were more active in the organization and regulation of economic
activity.  But the contributions  to development that derived from the
aggregation of political and economic power became a constraint on local or
regional political development and on private economic  activity.
Cultural Endowments
The assumption that cultural endowments play a fundamental role  in
political development  is so pervasive that it often remains implicit rather
than explicit in the political development literature.  This  is  in sharp
contrast to  the treatment of cultural endowments  in economics, where  cultural
considerations have been cast into the "underworld" of development thought and
practice.44  It would be hard to find a leading scholar  in the field of
development economics who would commit themselves  in print to  the proposition
that, "In terms of explaining different patterns of political and economic
development  . . .a  central variable is  culture--the subjective attitudes,
beliefs, and values prevalent among the dominant groups  in the society." 4 5
In American political thought, it  is  assumed by almost all schools  from
the adherents  to the older legal-formalist tradition, to  the more recent
behavioral and public choice schools that the ideas  embodied in the United19
States constitution were a product of the political culture of the
enlightenment.  This  is  illustrated by the  1976 exchange  about constitutional
choice between Vincent Ostrom and William Riker.4 6  Ostrom argued that  the
design of the United States constitution, with a federal structure, separation
of powers, and democratic election of the legislature and the executive as
central elements, has been responsible for the maintenance of a system in
which broad areas of political and economic activity remain outside  the direct
purview of public authority.  Riker argued, in contrast that we  are not free
because of constitutional design but that the constitutional design was a
reflection of the political culture of a free people.  He argues, more
broadly, that constitutional design is derivative of political culture  rather
than its  source.  But there  is greater agreement between Ostrom and Riker than
either concedes.  Ostrom did not  argue that United States constitutional
design was cut from "whole cloth."  The political culture of  the enlightenment
was  the product of several centuries of thought and practice  in the evolution
of systems of governance that could function effectively without the unlimited
exercise of sovereign authority.47
The view that political culture  forms a coherent pattern that  informs
political thought and governs  (but does not determine) political behavior in
any society represents  the central core of the research program pursued by
Lucian W. Pye beginning with his  studies of politics and personality in
Southeast Asia, his  active role  in the SSRC Committee on Comparative
Politics, and his more recent analysis of the  relationship between cultural
endowment and political development in Asia.4 8
Pye argues that it  is  possible to  characterize Asian political culture
in a way that distinguishes  it from the political cultures of Latin America,20
Africa or the West.  The most significant is  the Asian tendency to place more
value on the collective and to  be less  sensitive than the West to  the values
of individualism.  "Western  belief that progress should result in ever greater
scope for individual autonomy is not taken as self evident by most Asian, who
are more inclined to believe that greater happiness comes  from suppressing
self-interest in favor of group solidarity.49  This results  in a style of
political leadership that is,  at least from a Western perspective, highly
paternalistic.  Ritual plays a particularly strong role  in assuring the
legitimacy of political power--either in the ethical-moral sociopolitical
sense characteristic of the Sinic cultures;  the cosmic origins  of ritualized
power in South Asia;  or the patron-client style of personal power in Southeast
Asia.
Pye also argues that the drive toward modernization requires and imposes
change in personality and culture.  Cultures do converge during the process of
modernization.  Yet he insists,  the political cultures of Asia will retrain
strong parochial dimensions.  Economic growth will be associated with polities
in which the structure of political power will reflect very different
attitudes  toward power and authority than in the West.
Political  Power and Political Development
It  is hard to escape  the conclusion that the scholars who have been
engaged in advancing knowledge in the field of political development have
been reluctant to confront the central question of political development.
Unless political development has little meaning, other than political change,
it  is necessary to answer a central question--what is  it  that grows  in the
process  of political development?  In the case  of economic development, the
answer is  fairly straightforward.  What grows  is  socially productive economic21
capacity measured in terms of its physical, institutional and human
resources.  If instead of the development of a society's economy we are
concerned with the development of its polity, we must also attempt to  identify
what grows.  I will argue that the most obvious  candidate for what  it  is  that
grows  in political development is power!
But what is power?  Power occupied a central role  in the literature of
political science  in the  1950s.50  It was viewed as an instrument or a
resource  to be used in advancing other objectives or values.  It was  also
viewed as  the central phenomena to be explained by political science.  But
the concept of power has also been the subject of considerable professional
controversy.  Some scholars have suggested that the concept  is  so ambiguous
that it should be abandoned.  More recently Lucian W. Pye has argued that
power should serve as  the central concept in a revitalization of scholarship
in the field of political development.51
The traditional definitions of power share a view of power as  an
instrument that enables agents to  alter the behavior of other agents.  "A has
power over B to  the extent that he can get B to  do something that B would not
otherwise do." 52  This  definition has been extended to  include not only overt
constraint but also indirect or latent constraints. 53  To paraphrase--"A has
power over B if A can effect the incentives  facing B in such a way that  it  is
rational  for B to do  something he would not otherwise have chosen to  do."  It
has served as  the conceptual foundation for efforts  to develop empirical
measures  of power.54
This  instrumentalist  (or manipulative) approach to  the definition of
power has been criticized as  excessively empirical.5 5  Jeffrey C.  Isaac
argues, on methodological grounds, for a  "thicker" structuralist or realist22
approach to the nature of power.  Theories  of power should not depend on the
unique characteristics of individuals, but "their social identities as
participants in enduring, socially structured relationships."56   Isaacs
argues that social or political power should be defined in terms of  the
capacities  to act--the  "power to"--possessed by social agents.5 7  Isaac does
not, however, provide us with a contemporary road map to  guide  investigation
along the research agenda he has proposed.
In searching for an approach to understand the role of power in
political development, I find  it useful to draw on an important paper by
Talcott Parsons,58  that was neglected by Isaac.  The significance of Parson's
paper for the analysis of political development is that he regards power as a
system resource that is capable of expansion or growth.  He directly
challenges  the "limited good" or  "zero sum" definition of power implicit in
the work the instrumentalist schools  as well as  in the work of later critics.
In Parson's view, the political system or the polity of a society is  composed
of the ways in which the relevant components of the total  system are organized
to achieve effective  action--that is the "power to"  achieve both collective
and individual goals.59
Parsons also raises the question of whether the hierarchical
organization of political systems necessarily implies  that political
resources must, by their very nature, be distributed more unequally than
economic resources?  Parsons does not believe so.  He suggests  two constraints
on the hierarchial ordering of power.  One is the franchise.  In "the
leadership systems of the most  'advanced' national societies,  the power
element has been systematically equalized through the device of  the
franchise."60 Arendt, writing from an intense normative perspective, makes23
the  same point more elegantly, "Under conditions of representative government,
the people are  supposed to  rule those who govern them."61  In a democratic
system, the franchise is  the  one resource that is  distributed equally.62  And
even in authoritarian systems, as  Pye as noted in his study of Asian political
systems,  it  is  a great illusion of politics to assume "that power flows
downward from the ruler through the elite to the masses, whereas  in actual
fact the process  is precisely the reverse." 63
The second constraint stems  from the interpretation of economy and
polity.  The  interpenetration of economy and polity plays a critical role  in
the expansion or growth of political resources or power.64  The  structural
requirements for the organization of a productive economy places limits  on  the
ability of the political system to obtain control over commodities  and
services.  The productivity of the economy is  in turn dependent on an economic
organization that is  capable of mobilizing the productive effort or  the
competence of its  constituents.  Parsons argues that this  requires  equality of
opportunity--the  equalization of opportunities for citizens  to participate
meaningfully and effectively in the  shaping of the polity of which they are a
part.6 5
We are now ready to  return to  the question that was posed at  the
beginning of  this section--What is  it  that grows in the process  of political
development?  It seems clear that my initial intuition has a  solid basis in
the literature of political science  if not in the literature of political
development.  What grows  in political development  is power!  Furthermore,  its
growth may be measured in terms of both its concentration and its
distribution.24
If this is correct, the distribution of political power must be given
much more attention than in the political development literature  of the  1960s
and 1970s.66  By conceptualizing power in terms of both its amount and its
distribution, it is  possible to make two important theoretical propositions
about its  growth:  (1)  Power that is closely held, or highly concentrated,
faces severe constraints on its  growth;  (2)  Power that is loosely held, that
is equally distributed, also faces severe constraints on its  growth.  In both
cases the growth of power, primarily along a single dimension, runs  into
diminishing returns.  If one accepts these two propositions,  it is then
possible to maintain that political development has advanced  (a)  if the amount
of power available to a society grows with no worsening of the distribution of
power:  or (b)  if the distribution of power has become more equal with no
decline  in the amount of power available to a society.
Huntington was surely correct in insisting that the concept of political
development should be reversible--that it  should be broad enough to  cover the
possibility of political decay.  The above definition meets this  test.  If
rapid political mobilization is not accompanied by sufficiency rapid
institutionalization of political processes greater equity in the distribution
of political power may be accompanied by loss  of aggregate political power.67
Conversely the aggregation of political power at the center may be acquired at
the expense  of a reduction in political "density"--or less equal distribution
of political power.  In both cases political decay can be said to  occur.
A further advantage of this definition is  that  it can incorporate the
effects of geographic expansion (or contraction) of states  and empires as
well as changes over time.  If geographic expansion, in addition to
aggregating power,  improves the distribution of power by creating new25
opportunities for the population incorporated into the larger unit geographic
expansion can be said to  contribute to  political development.  The creation of
the European Economic Community may be an example.  In some cases political
development may be associated with a reduction in the geographic extent of  a
nation or an empire.  It could be argued, for example,  that the break up of
the French colonial empire contributed to  the political development of France.
But did it contribute  to political development or decay in Algeria?
Some Analytics
It may be useful  to attempt a simple diagrammatic  exposition of  the
relationship between changes  in the concentration, the  distribution  and the
growth of power.  In Figure  1 let the concentration of power be measured along
the Y axis and the distribution of power along the X axis, and the  level  or
amount of power along a vertical axis.  The  level of power, and the
willingness of a society to make trade-offs between power concentration and
distribution of power is described by the family of iso-power curves, Pl,
P2  *.. Pn.  A society characterized by iso-power curve  P2 has available  to  it
more power than a society described by Pl . Societies  characterized different
cultural endowments can be expected to have different  "tastes"  for
concentration and distribution of power.  This  could be depicted by a family
of  iso-power curves with different slopes  than the  family depicted in
Figure 1.
The capacity of a society to achieve a particular level of power can be
illustrated by the family of iso-power capacity or transformation curves  Cl,
C2  ...  CN.  The power transformation curve measures the trade-off between
concentrated or centralized state power and power distribution or
decentralized individual or community power.  Cl on the Y  axis depicts a26
situation in which growth in political and economic resources would be
focused on achieving greater concentration of power;  C1  on the X axis depicts
a situation in which growth in political and economic  resources would be
focused on achieving greater distribution of power.  The institutional
resources available to a society to transform centralized into decentralized
power  (or the reverse) as described by a family of iso-capacity curves,  is
shaped by a polities institutional history.  It may be easier for some
societies  to expand power along the Y rather than along the X axis.  Movement
along either the power distribution or power concentration axis can, as  noted
above, be expected to  run into diminishing ratios.
Given a societies cultural endowments,  the optimum mix of concentration
and distribution of power is where P1  and C1 intersect at L1.  At this point a
society achieves  consistency between its  taste and capacity for power.
Furthermore, its  optimum or least cost growth path is along OLn  unless  the
factors  that determine the societies capacity or taste for power change.  A
polity that is  able to devote more resources to  the accumulation of power can
be described by the iso-capacity curve C2 . C1  and C 2  may also be used to
describe  the same societies iso-capacity curves at two different points in
time.  In this case one can say that the polity has experienced a growth in
power between tI  and t2  and that there has been an increase of power at both
the level of the state  (Y2-Y1) and the community or  individual  (X2-X1).
Figure 2 illustrates how differences in the iso-power curves, which
reflect a polities capacity to generate power, can result in different power
growth paths.  Assume, for example, two new states, both with balanced or
"neutral" preferences toward authoritarian or libertarian polity described by
PI, P2  .*** n-  One of the new states has, however, inherited an institutional27
structure that makes it easier for power to  grow along the concentrated rather
than the dispersed dimension.  This  is depicted by the set of iso-capacity
curves C1 , C2  ...  Cn .  In contrast  the iso-capacity curves C1 , C2,...  Cn
depict a polity that has inherited a set of institutions that make  it  easier
to  expand power by widening its distribution.  Thus,  in spite of the same
"taste" for concentration and distribution of power the two polities  will
exhibit quite different paths of political development  (G1 and G2).
One might characterize path G1  as an "authoritarian" path;  G'  as
"corporatist" and G2  as a "pluralist" path.  Centrally planned authoritarian
societies  (as  in the case of  the USSR) would lie to  the left of G1 . Social
corporatism (as  in Austria) would occupy the space slightly to  the  left of G';
liberal corporatism  (as in the case of  the Netherlands) would lie slightly to
the right.68  A recent article by Cynthia Taft Morris suggests that one might
associate Argentina with the inherited political institutions represented by
C1 , C2  ... Cn.  Canada might be associated with the inherited political
institutions represented by C 1 ,  C2  ...  Cn.69  Other stylized examples can also
be suggested.  A poor society ruled by an authoritarian ruler  (such as
Ethiopia in 1750)  might be located at the  intersection of G1  and Cl  while a
poor society with a less  authoritarian system of governance  (such as  the
Iroquois Federation in 1750)  might be located at the  intersection of G2  and C1
in Figure 2.  In spite of differences in the concentration and distribution of
power only very limited power to  achieve personal or societal goals was
available to  either individuals  or government in the  two societies.
The analytical framework suggested in this section is  quite  flexible.
Different paths of political development can also be generated by assuming
two different polities with the  same iso-capacity curves and different iso-28
power curves  to  reflect different tastes for power concentration and
distribution.  Or if one enjoys geometry, one can approach reality more
closely by constructing a set of curves in which the two polities differ in
additional dimensions.  The important point is that different societies can
be expected to  follow different paths  of growth and distribution of power.
In the 1950s,  as noted earlier, it was popular to assume convergence toward
the G 1  path.
In the 1980s  it has become increasingly popular to assume convergence
toward the G 2  path.70  Francis Fukuyama, in an article that has achieved
considerable notoriety, has characterized the political changes underway in
Eastern Europe and the USSR as  "an unabashed victory of economic  and political
liberalism.71  John R. Freeman argues,  largely on theoretical grounds,  that
corporatist mixed economies are capable of superior economic and political
performance.72  It  is  possible that the several paths will converge toward
some Ln  (Figure 1).  At present, however, I  would be reluctant to assume
convergence toward some equilibrium path in either the G1  or the G2 direction
(Figure 2).73
On Measurement
A continuing puzzle in the political development literature  is  why so
little effort has been devoted to  attempts  to model and measure the political
development process.  The  importance of measurement has been widely
emphasized.  Some of the conceptual problems of measuring power, conceived as
a reciprocal but asymmetrical relationship between two parties, were outlined
by Simon in 1953. 74  The measurement of community power was  the  subject of
considerable disagreement, centering on the work of Dahl and Mills, in the
late 1950s and early 1960s.75 Huntington stressed the  importance of29
developing a definition of political development that would lend itself to
quantification  in his classic analysis of "Political Development and Political
Decay. "76  Attempts have been made  to measure particular dimensions of
political development along one or more of the dimensions of development of
the Parsonian structural  functionalist model.  One of the more successful
attempts has been the sectoral approach employed by Peter Flora and his
associates to  quantify differences  in the growth of the welfare state among
the western democracies.77   But  the only broad scale  frontal assault on the
problem of measurement have been the determinedly atheoretical efforts by
Morris and Adelman.78
How important  is  the  issue of measurement?  Economists have found the
concept of utility analytically useful even though there continues  to be
substantial disagreement about its measurement.  Can power be treated in
political science in a way that is  analogous to  the way utility is  treated in
economies?  The  inputs  into the power function  (analogous  to a production
function) that determines the  focus  and form of the iso-capacity curve,  for a
particularly society at a particular time,  are largely institutional. 79
Whether the iso-capacity curve is biased toward the power concentration or
power distribution axis will depend on the  traditions  and strength of  a
nation's  civil and military bureaucracies,  of its judicial system, and  the
degree of centralization or decentralization of its governance structure.  But
the problem of measurement of the  growth and distribution of power, or of
reasonable proxies,  should not face unreasonable difficulties.
An important advantage  of the model outlined in Figures  1 and 2, which
incorporates the relationship between changes  in the concentration,
distribution and growth of power  is  that it does advance  the possibility of30
constructing a productive dialogue between measurement and theory.  It  should
not, for example, be too difficult to design measures of the degree of
decentralization of power--conceived in terms of "power to"--among the
several  levels of government.  Nor should  it be too difficult to measure  the
extent to which power is concentrated within a small political elite.  And
with measures of the variables on the vertical and horizontal coordinates of
Figures  1  and 2, it should be possible to plot the location of different
societies on the iso-power maps of Figures 1 and 2 and estimate elasticities
of substitution between the concentration and distribution of power.
What Have We Learned?
I am forced to conclude that efforts to  identify the political
preconditions or conditions for economic development have not been as
fruitful as I had hoped.  The only empirical generalization that appears
relatively secure  is the apparent association between authoritarian political
organization and rapid economic growth at the beginning of the development
process for  the presently developed countries.  Reasonably firm evidence to
support this view is found in both the economic development and political
development literature.  It also seems apparent, although the empirical basis
for the generalization is less  secure, that highly centralized political
systems become an obstacle  to economic  growth as  countries evolve toward
middle income status.  The economic and political crisis  experienced by
Germany, Italy, and Japan in the interwar period and by the USSR and the
Eastern European centrally planned economies at  the present are consistent
with this generalization.
The policy  implications of the authoritarian growth model seem far  less
secure than a generation ago.  This is  because of the internal stress  that31
authoritarian political systems undergo as  they attempt to  make the
transitions  to a polity in which political resources are more equitably
distributed.  Spain may be cited as a country in which this  transition
occurred while maintaining both political stability and rapid economic
growth.  But the number of examples are relatively few.  Korea, Taiwan, and
Chile will represent important test cases among the authoritarian economies.
Poland will represent an important test case among the centrally planned
economies.  A central  issue that will influence the success of the
transformation will be whether it will be feasible to make the transition to  a
decentralized economic system without also making the transition to  a
political system in which there  is  a wider distribution of political
resources.80
What are  the implications  of these conclusions for scholarship  in
economic and political development--particularly for collaboration between
scholars working  in the fields of political and economic development?  The
last two decades have seen exceedingly fruitful collaboration between
political scientists and economist  in the modeling of economic  and political
activity and in sub-fields such as  public choice.  Common familiarity with the
rational choice paradigm has provided the  two disciplines with an increasingly
common analytical language--shared even among those who disagree  about the
value of the paradigm.  But as  yet, there are few linguistic or analytical
bridges between the subdisciplines of political and economic development.
What inferences  should be drawn from this  observation?  One  inference
might be that economists should continue their search for the sources  of
economic  development--measured in terms  of the growth and distribution of
income--without too much help from the field of political development.32
Similarly, political scientists  should continue  their search for the sources
of political development--measured in terms of the growth and distribution of
power--without expecting too much help from the discipline of economics.
An even more pessimistic inference might be that both disciplines
abandon their attempts to understand the processes of political and economic
development and re-focus their attention, using the tools of rational and
public choice, on the analysis and design of public policy.  The daily lives
of people in both the developing and developed countries, whether
characterized by authoritarian or  liberal polities or by market or centrally
planned economies are conditioned by the policies being  pursued by their
governments.  Whether a society is  pursuing an import-substitution or an
export-oriented trade policy has immediate implications for economic growth
and the distribution of the dividends  from economic  growth.
I am, however, reluctant to come  to either of these conclusions.  While
the cross elasticity between the growth of economic resources  and political
resources may be less elastic than Parson suggested, it  is  clearly very high.
Economic resources are continuously translated into political resources and
large political resources are employed by most societies  to  obtain greater
access  to  economic resources.  I am forced to  conclude  that scholars working
in the field of economic and political development must begin to  develop
research agendas  that will facilitate greater collaboration if they are  to be
successful at understanding the growth of either the economic or political
resources available to a society.Xl  X2   X
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